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PROCESS-RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT PRETRIAL
IDENTIFICATIONS
The area of law surrounding the conduct of pretrial identifica-
tions has been rather sketchy with regard to when the right to
counsel attaches and how far the police may go without violating
an accused's due process rights. However, there have been recent
developments in this area which become apparent through an
analysis of the different types of identification procedures, the
point at which the right to counsel becomes critical, the role of
counsel at the identification proceeding, and the due process
checks on identification procedures.
I. IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES DISTINGUISHED
In order to illustrate potential abuses of an accused's rights,
it is helpful to first examine the manner in which each is con-
ducted.
By far the most common type of identification procedure is the
lineup, which is conducted by placing in a line a group of persons
having similar physical characteristics.' As the subjects stand sta-
tionary facing him, the witness views them to determine whether
he recognizes any of the participants as the suspect.
An identification parade is similar to a lineup except that the
members of the group walk out separately to be observed by the
viewing witness.' In both of these identification procedures, the
subjects may be asked to try on certain articles of clothing,3 or to
repeat certain innocuous phrases for voice identification purposes.4
The showup is the method of identification which is most
highly criticized as being unfairly suggestive.' The witness is asked
United States v. Hamilton, 469 F.2d 880, 882 n.1 (9th Cir. 1972).
2 See generally Williams and Hammelmann, Identification Parades (pt. 1),
1963 CRIM. L. Rv. (Eng.) 479.
People v. Parham, 60 Cal. 2d 378, 384 P.2d 1001, 33 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1963).
United States ex rel. Bennett v. Myers, 381 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1967), celt.
denied, 390 U.S. 973 (1968).
See WALL, EyEwrrNss IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 26-40 (1965); Paul,
Identification of Accused Persons, 12 AusT. L.J. 42, 44 (1938).
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to come to the police station to view one person who is being held,
the purpose being to determine whether or not a positive identifi-
cation can be made by the witness.' The idea of a one-to-one con-
frontation, combined with the police's belief that they have found
the suspect, might sway an otherwise unbiased witness to make a
positive identification.7
Finally, photographic displays are also widely used for identi-
fication, especially when the police have not, as yet, brought the
suspect into custody. The witness is shown several photographs or
a book of "mug shots" from which he is asked whether he can
identify a suspect.'
II. PROBLEMS AND PREJUDICES INHERENT IN PRETRIAL
IDENTIFICATIONS
Most authorities, as well as police officials and the conductors
of identification procedures, agree that eyewitness identification is
the most unreliable form of proof.9 Mr. Justice Frankfurter once
wrote: "What is the worth of identification testimony even when
uncontradicted? The identification of strangers is proverbially
untrustworthy. The hazards of such testimony are established by
a formidable number of instances in the records of English and
American trials." 0 A major factor contributimg to the high incid-
ence of mistaken identification is the degree of suggestion inherent
in the manner in which suspects are presented to witnesses for
pretrial identification." In a California case, all members of the
lineup but the suspect were known to the identifying witness. In
Layton v. State, 500 S.W.2d 267, 268 n.1 (Mo. App. 1973).
Paul, Identification of Accused Persons, 12 Aust. L.J. 42, 44 (1938).
20 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS Eyewitness Identification § 11 (1968). Photo-
graphic displays are not specifically treated in this article; however, it should be
noted that the right to counsel during their conduct is not as broad as in other forms
of identification procedures. See Umited States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973), where
the United States Supreme Court held that a photographic display is quite different
from a lineup because there are fewer possibilities of impermissible suggestion, and
those unfair influences can be readily reconstructed at trial. For this reason, the
Court held that a photographic display cannot be considered a critical stage of the
criminal prosecution, and therefore, the suspect is not entitled to the assistance of
counsel during its conduct even after indictment.
I Murray, The Criminal Lineup at Home and Abroad, 1966 UTAH L. REV. 610;
WILLIAMS, THE PROOF OF GUILT 106-124 (3d ed. 1963).
10 F. FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETTI 30 (1927).
" United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967).
12 People v. James, 218 Cal. App. 2d 166, 32 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1963).
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other cases, the other participants in the lineup were grossly dis-
similar in appearance to the suspect,' 3 only the suspect was re-
quired to wear distinctive clothing which the culprit allegedly
wore," the suspect was pointed out before or during the lineup,"
and in a case where the participants in the lineup were asked to
try on an article of clothing, it fit only the accused." Suggestion
can be created either intentionally or unintentionally, but the re-
sult is the same: the accused is denied the right to a fair trial.
Another problem inherent in pretrial identifications is that
the accused is often unable to reconstruct what occurred at the
confrontation and is thereby denied a full hearing on the identifi-
cation issue at trial.'7 "Improper influences may go undetected by
a suspect, guilty or not, who experiences the emotional tension
which we might expect in one being confronted by potential accu-
sers." 8 Those participating in the lineup with the accused may
often be police officers." If the issue of the fairness of the lineup is
presented at trial, the jury's choice is between the defendant's
unsupported version of what transpired and that of the police offi-
cers present.2 In any event, neither witnesses nor lineup partici-
pants are likely to be alert for conditions prejudicial to the suspect.
Moreover, the injustice is compounded by the fact that once a
witness has picked out the accused at the lineup, he is not likely
to go back on his word at trial, even though he may later have had
second thoughts.'
III. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
Historically, lineups, showups, and identification parades
'3 Fredericksen v. United States, 266 F.2d 463 (D.D.C. 1959); People v. Adell,
75 Ill. App. 2d 385, 221 N.E.2d 72 (1966); State v. Hill, 193 Kan. 512, 394 P.2d 106
(1964).
" Presley v. State, 224 Md. 550, 168 A.2d 510 (1961); State v. Bazemore, 193
N.C. 336, 137 S.E. 172 (1927); Barrett v. State, 190 Tenn. 366, 229 S.W.2d 516
(1950).
11 People v. Clark, 28 111. 2d 423, 192 N.E.2d 851 (1963); Gillespie v. State, 355
P.2d 451 (Okla. Crim. 1960).
" People v. Parham, 60 Cal. 2d 378, 384 P.2d 1001, 33 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1963).
'7 388 U.S. at 230-231.
"Id.
" United States v. Richards, 442 F.2d 922 (4th Cir. 1971); People v. Boney, 28
Ill. 2d 505, 192 N.E.2d 920 (1963).
In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 340 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
2' Williams and Hammelmann, Identification Parades (pt. 1), 1963 CaiM. L.
REv. (Eng.) 479, 482.
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have been accepted as a proper and legal method of identifying
suspects."2 Early in the development of such procedures, they were
attacked as being a forced presentation by the accused of his physi-
cal characteristics for viewing by a witness, which incriminated
him in violation of his fifth amendment rights.? This argument
was short-lived, however, when the United States Supreme Court
declared that the presentation of physical characteristics in court
was not protected by the fifth amendment. 4 In so deciding, the
Court stated: "[Tihe prohibition of compelling a man in a crimi-
nal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use
of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from
him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be
material." Although the privilege against self-incrimination is no
longer confined to the trial stages in the majority of courts," an
accused may not protect himself from exhibition in a lineup by
claiming denial of that amendment's protection.
The United States Supreme Court reaffirmed this view in
United States v. Wadel when it held that the mere exhibition of
the defendant's person for observation by a prosecution witness
prior to the trial is not of testimonial significance s and requires no
disclosure by the defendant of any knowledge he might have.29 A
California court extended this reasoning by holding that requiring
the accused to assume poses or to utter particular phrases was not
testimonial compulsion within the purview of the fifth amend-
ment. 0
2 Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 252-53.
26 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
388 U.S. 218, 221-23.
1 It is now generally accepted that the privilege against self-incrimination is
limited to testimonial compulsion where the witness is forced to divulge informa-
tion which might be used against him or which might uncover further evidence
against him. McCarthy v. Aindstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924). The emphasis is upon
protecting the accused from being required to provide information through the use
of physical or moral pressures. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1910).
21 388 U.S. at 222.
11 People v. Lopez, 60 Cal. 2d 223, 243-44, 384 P.2d 16, 27-28, 32 Cal. Rptr. 424,
435-36 (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 994 (1964).
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IV. SAFEGUARDS ASSURING THE FAIR CONDUCT OF IDENTIFICATION
PROCEDURES
A. Right to Counsel
Recent cases have relied upon the sixth amendment as a
means of establishing the constitutional boundaries for identifica-
tion procedures.3' The right of an accused to the assistance of coun-
sel is guaranteed by state and federal constitutions at all critical
stages of a prosecution.2 That right, however, attaches only "at or
after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceed-
ings-whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, in-
dictment, information, or arraignment."3 Given this fundamental
right to counsel, there remains the question whether an accused is
entitled to the assistance of counsel during a pretrial identification
procedure.Y The United States Supreme Court supplied a partial
answer in United States v. Wade35 and Gilbert v. California" where
the Court first extended the right to counsel to post-indictment
lineups. The Court held that the sixth amendment guarantees an
1, Both the courts and defendants are concerned that the assistance of counsel
may be necessary during the conduct of pretrial identifications so that the defen-
dant may get a fair trial. The justification claimed by the defendants is that only
when counsel is present are they assured that the procedure will be properly con-
ducted. Otherwise, the police may not consider the defendants' due process rights,
and the pretrial abuses will not be rectified at the trial. When counsel is not present,
"[p]rivacy results in secrecy and this in turn results in a gap in our knowledge as
to what in fact goes on" at the proceeding. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448
(1966). Counsel cannot attack such abuses at trial if he has no proof that they in
fact existed. The courts, on the other hand, consider two critical questions before
determining whether the sixth amendment right to counsel applies in a particular
case. They are (1) whether the identification procedure in question provides a
potential substantial prejudice to the defendant's rights, and (2) whether the pres-
ence of or participation by counsel might make a difference to the defendant. 388
U.S. at 227.
32 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). This issue reached the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in State ex rel. May v. Boles, 149 W. Va. 155,
139 S.E.2d 177 (1964). There the court held first, that the sixth amendment is
obligatory upon the states under the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment; second, that the right to counsel is essential to a fair trial and is therefore a
fundamental right; and, third, that the accused is entitled to counsel at every stage
of the prosecution where his fundamental rights may be affected.
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972).
31 Pretrial identification procedures, as referred to in this article, include line-
ups, showups, and identification parades. See text accompanying notes I - 7, supra.
388 U.S. 218 (1967).
N 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
[Vol. 78
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accused the right to counsel not only at trial, but also at pretrial
proceedings where the accused's rights to a fair trial might be
endangered. The Court further held that a post-indictment
pretrial lineup is a critical stage of the criminal prosecution within
the meaning of Powell v. Alabama,3 7 because the results obtained
there might well determine the accused's fate." Once a viewing
witness has made an identification before trial, he will not likely
change his mind at the trial itself; so, in effect, the identification
issue is conclusively determined at the lineup.
The Wade decision left unanswered the question of whether
the sixth amendment is applicable to pre-indictment lineups,
showups, or identification parades. The Supreme Court was faced
with this question in Kirby v. Illinois39 which involved a pre-
indictment showup.' The Court stated in a plurality opinion that
a showup after arrest, but before the initiation of any adversary
criminal proceeding, is not a criminal prosecution at which the
accused is entitled to counsel as a matter of right.4 ' Although it
remains unclear what constitutes the initiation of an adversary
- 287 U.S. 45 (1932). In this case, seven Negroes, strangers in the community,
were charged with the rape of two white girls. Upon indictment, six were arraigned
and pleaded not guilty. They were not asked whether they had, or were able to
employ, counsel, or whether they wished to have counsel appointed for them. They
were hurried to trial without effective assistance of counsel and without adequate
opportunity to consult with the counsel casually appointed to represent them. The
court held that the defendants were entitled to the assistance of counsel at all
critical stages of the prosecution as a requisite of due process of law. This principle
requires that all pretrial confrontations be carefully scrutinized to determine
whether the presence of counsel is necessary to preserve the defendant's right to a
fair trial.
31 The court justified its determination that a pretrial lineup is a critical stage
as follows: eyewitness testimony is not generally reliable, yet it is given considerable
weight by the jury; since no disinterested persons are present at the proceeding, the
accused is not in a position to reconstruct what occurred when he comes to trial;
and unfair techniques used by police create a potential influence on witnesses. 388
U.S. at 229-35. For a discussion of the role of counsel at the lineup, see text accom-
panying notes 68-91, infra.
ID 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
, Kirby and his companion were stopped for interrogation and taken to the
police station on suspicion of robbery. Both were identified in a showup at that time
which was six weeks prior to their indictment. Neither suspect had been advised
of his right to counsel, nor did either ask for or receive legal assistance. Id.
," 406 U.S. at 689-90. The Court further held that the per se exclusionary rule
of United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S.
263 (1967), did not apply to pre-indictment confrontations. 406 U.S. at 686. But
see note 49 infra.
6
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criminal proceeding, many lower courts have held that Wade does
not apply to pre-indictment confrontations between the accused
and the witness.2 Such were the holdings in State v. Moore43 and
State v. Stollings.44 In Moore, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals stated that "[ilt is not . . . essential to the guarantee of
an accused's constitutional rights that he be afforded the assis-
tance of counsel at every stage of the investigation-from the com-
mission of the crime to the time of his arrest."4 Rather than defin-
ing the starting point of an adversary proceeding, the court, relying
on Kirby, stated that a routine investigation is not an adversary
proceeding, and a lineup conducted during the course of such an
investigation does not entitle a suspect to the assistance of coun-
sel.46 In Kirby, the Court stated:
The initiation of judicial criminal proceedings is far from
a mere formalism. It is the starting point of our whole system
of adversary criminal justice. For it is only then that the govern-
ment has committed itself to prosecute, and only then that the
adverse positions of government and defendent have solidified.47
Since the exact moment of attachment of the right to counsel
has not been specifically defined, authorities differ in opinion
whether it attaches at arraignment or at the moment an arrest
warrant is obtained. A Michigan court in a case decided before
Kirby took the view that the presence of counsel is not always
required in all suspect confrontations with witnesses, particularly
where the confrontation is an on-the-scene identification in the
course of, or immediately following a crime. However, where the
investigation ceases to be a general investigation of "unsolved
crime" and focuses upon the accused, the rule is otherwise. Coun-
42 Wimberly v. State, 233 Ga. 386, 211 S.E.2d 281 (1974); Contra, People v.
Fowler, 46 Mich. Ct. App. 237, 208 N.W.2d 41 (1973).
212 S.E.2d 608 (W. Va. 1975).
" 212 S.E.2d 745 (W. Va. 1975).
, State v. Moore, 212 S.E.2d 608, 612-13 (W. Va. 1975).
" In Moore, the lineup occurred pursuant to and during a routine investigation
of a breaking and entering, prior to the indictment of the defendant. The case had
not reached the prosecutorial stage, so the court, relying on Kirby, and limiting
Wade and Gilbert to their facts, declared that the defendant was not entitled to
the assistance of counsel. In Stollings, the defendant was identified at the police
station where he was being held for another offense. The victim was called to the
jail to either identify or exonerate him prior to indictment. Again the suspect was
not entitled to the assistance of counsel. Taken together, these two cases bring West
Virginia in line with the Wade and Gilbert decisions.
41 406 U.S. at 689.
[Vol. 78
7
Fuller: Criminal Procedure--Due Process--Right to Counsel at Pretrial Ide
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1975
STUDENT NOTES
sel is required if the purpose of the confrontation is to build a case
against the defendant by eliciting identification evidence, but not
if the purpose of the identification procedure is to extinguish a case
against an innocent bystander." This case suggests that an ac-
cused is entitled to counsel even during the investigatory stages of
the prosecution, provided that the police believe they have a sus-
pect and are trying to build a case against him. Although this case
holds that the controlling factor is the purpose of the confronta-
tion, it still leaves the exact moment of attachment of the right to
counsel uncertain. Until another pre-indictment case reaches the
United States Supreme Court, and a more definitive decision is
reached, the state courts are free to decide for themselves the rele-
vant moment of attachment. " The only guidance from Wade and
Gilbert is that counsel must be present during a post-indictment
lineup, showup, or identification parade, or the accused may claim
denial of his sixth amendment rights.
B. Due Process Check on the Conduct of Identification Proce-
dures
Due process considerations also provide a safeguard for the
conduct of lineups. Such rights are violated in an identification
procedure which gives rise to "a very substantial likelihood of irre-
parable misidentification."50 The United States Supreme Court
has stated that a "violation of due process of law in the conduct
of a confrontation depends on the totality of the circumstances
surrounding it." 5' It is interesting to note, however, that the Court
has found the surrounding circumstances of the identification pro-
cess to be violative of due process in only one case.2 The first case
attempting to establish guidelines in determining the reliability of
48 People v. Hutton, 21 Mich. App. 312, 175 N.W.2d 860 (1970).
" It should be noted that Kirby was decided by a plurality of four Justices with
one Justice concurring in the result. This implies that the issue of whether counsel
is required during a pre-indictment lineup may not have been finally decided.
0 Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968).
51 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967).
11 Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969). Foster, the defendant, was placed
in a lineup with three other men, two of whom were considerably shorter than he.
The victim was unable to identify a suspect, so Foster was brought into an office
for a one-to-one confrontation. The victim still could not make a positive identifica-
tion. About a week later, Foster participated in another lineup with four different
men at which time the victim positively identified him as the robber. The Court
held the conduct of the lineup to be so unfairly suggestive as to amount to a denial
of due process of law. Id. at 443.
8
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an identification was Neil v. Biggers.3 The Court set out five fac-
tors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of misidentifi-
cation, and most courts subsequently deciding the due process
issue have noted them. 4 They are "the opportunity of the witness
to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness's degree
of attention, the accuracy of the witness's prior description of the
criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the
confrontation."55 The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in
State v. Stollings mentioned that the in-court identification was
positive and completely unshaken by cross-examination, and that
the witness demonstrated a high degree of certainty in his identifi-
cation of the defendant. Further, the witness had a good chance
for observation during the commission of the crime. These factors
led the court to conclude that there had been no denial of due
process because of the pretrial identification.
Although the due process argument is available as an avenue
by which to attack the suggestiveness and unfairness of lineups, it
is by no means an easy solution since many courts in viewing the
totality of the circumstances generally find that there has been no
such denial of due process.
V. THE WADE DOCTRINE AND ITS EFFECT ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
EVIDENCE 7
The Court in Gilbert held that the admission of an in-court
identification is constitutional error if the trial court does not first
establish that such identification was not brought about or influ-
enced by an earlier illegal lineup procedure. 8 If such derivative
- 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
5, United States ex rel. Lucas v. Regan, 503 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1974); United States
ex rel. Smiley v. LaVallee, 473 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1973); Terry v. Peyton, 433 F.2d
1016 (4th Cir. 1970); Stroud v. Hall, 386 F. Supp. 24 (D. Mass. 1974).
409 U.S. at 199-200.
The court noted that the prosecuting witness had caught more than a fleet-
ing glance of the suspect because he stood face-to-face with the defendant while
defendant held a gun to his stomach. The defendant wore neither a mask nor a
disguise, and the premises were adequately lighted during the course of the robbery.
State v. Stollings, 212 S.E.2d 745, 748 (W. Va. 1975).
11 For a more extensive treatment of the Wade doctrine's effect on the admissi-
bility of evidence, see Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d 487 (1971).
58 388 U.S. at 269-74. Where there is substantial evidence that the lineup was
fairly conducted at a pretrial hearing on a motion to suppress the identification
evidence, the state has met its burden of establishing that the in-court identifica-
[Vol. 78
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evidence 9 is admitted, however, the state has the burden of prov-
ing that the in-court identification was not "come at by exploita-
tion of that illegality," but rather "by means sufficiently distin-
guishable to be purged of the primary taint.""0 In other words, the
Court adopted the "source" test,"' or, as it is sometimes referred
to, the "independent origin" test.12 The test requires that the in-
court identification stand on its own, and that the factors trigger-
ing the witness's identification at the trial must not include or be
dependent upon the prior illegal lineup identification. 3 In State v.
Moore, the West Virginia court stated that "[d]enial of a motion
to suppress courtroom identification. . . should not in itself form
a basis for a new trial at which such identification evidence will
be excluded without first giving the State the opportunity to estab-
lish by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identifica-
tion was based upon observation of the accused other than at the
lineup.""
If a witness directly testifies in court that he has previously
identified the accused in a lineup, showup, or identification parade
that was improperly conducted, any resulting conviction must be
overturned on that basis alone."5 The state is not entitled in such
a case to show that the in-court identification had an independent
source, the court's reasoning being that only a per se exclusionary
rule is effective as a deterrent to police officers in denying an
accused the presence of his counsel at the pretrial lineup or in
denying him his due process rights. If, however, the trial court is
tion was not influenced by an earlier illegal identification procedure. United States
v. Kennon, 447 F.2d 465, 466 (4th Cir. 1971). If the issue of fairness is not raised
until trial, counsel for the defendant is entitled to a hearing outside the presence
of the jury. Clemons v. United States, 408 F.2d 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 964 (1969). "Generally, a sufficient remedy is provided by an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether the in-court identifications were based on observa-
tions other than illegal procedures or whether the admission of improper out-of-
court identifications as part of the prosecution's proof constituted harmless error."
Kimbrough v. Cox, 444 F.2d 8, 11 (4th Cir. 1971).
11 Derivative evidence refers to evidence used at trial which was obtained by
an illegal process, and which would not have been available to the prosecution had
the illegal means not been employed.
11 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963).
" Id.; See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
62 Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272-74 (1967).
State v. Slie, 213 S.E.2d 109, 115 (W. Va. 1975).
" State v. Moore, 212 S.E.2d 608, 613 (W. Va. 1975).
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
10
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able to determine that such testimony was "harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt," then there need be no reversal."6 The test in
determining if the error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt"
is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence com-
plained of might have contributed to the conviction."
VI. THE ROLE OF COUNSEL AND SUGGESTIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF
PRETRIAL IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES
"The main purpose of an identification parade or lineup from
the point of view of the police is to provide them with fairly strong
evidence of identity on which to proceed with their investigations
and to base an eventual prosecution."" Since the identification
evidence is given so much weight even before the trial, it is impor-
tant to insure that the accused is not prejudiced at the initial
witness-suspect confrontation. As stated in Wade, "the trial which
might determine the accused's fate may well not be that in the
courtroom but that at the pretrial confrontation, with the State
aligned against the accused, the witness the sole jury, and the
accused unprotected against the overreaching, . . . with little or
no effective appeal from the judgment there rendered by the wit-
ness-'that's the man!' "69 In the interest of fairness to the accused,
the following guidelines should be kept in mind."
First, counsel should be present during the identification pro-
cedures. The Court in Wade mentioned two reasons why counsel
should be called to attend post-indictment, pretrial identification
confrontations. The first was that counsel could object to the
unfairness or suggestiveness of the procedure.' Although he is not
in a position to demand that the lineup be conducted in a particu-
lar manner, he would be able to make proposals with the hopes
that his requests might be respected. For example, before the
lineup proceedings begin, counsel might ask that the police warn
his client that if he is identified, such fact may be used against him
" Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). Harmless error rules are
designed to "block setting aside convictions for small errors or defects that have
little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial." Id. at 22.
" Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963).
, Williams and Hammelmann, Identification Parades, (pt. 1), 1963 CraM. L.
REV. (Eng.) 479, 482.
63 388 U.S. at 235-36.
70 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 786(a)(B)(2) (Chadbourn rev. 1970); Mueller, Com-
ment, 29 U. PiTr. L. REV. 65 (1967).
7, 388 U.S. at 223-27.
[Vol. 78
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in court." He may also make suggestions concerning the composi-
tion of the lineup and urge that the suspect be able to choose his
position in the line.7" The second suggestion was that counsel
would be better prepared for trial after attending the lineup. He
would then be in a position to note discrepancies in the witness's
testimony at the trial and to object to identification testimony
where the identification itself was obtained by an illegal proce-
dure. "
Second, a written record of the identification procedure should
be required. To implement the role of protecting the accused's
rights at trial, defense counsel should be afforded a complete writ-
ten report of everything that transpired at the lineup or showup,
including names, addresses, and descriptive details of the other
persons who participated in the identification. This report should
include reasons given by the witness for a particular identification
and the features of the suspect which sparked his recollection.
There should also be a written record taken in advance of the
viewing in which the witness would be required to give a complete
description of the criminal. These two reports taken together
would provide counsel with a means of attacking the reliability of
the eyewitness testimony on cross-examination, thus insuring the
defendant a full hearing at trial on the identification issue. Attor-
neys in jurisdictions which can afford a more accurate system of
record preservation could accomplish the same result in a more
efficient manner by using movie cameras and tape recorders.
Third, police should require, and counsel should insure, that
all participants are similar in appearance. The cases in which the
suspect was prejudiced by the police forcing him to wear distinc-
tive garb which set him apart from the others in the lineup are too
numerous to discuss in detail;7" however, a few are mentioned to
72 Comment, 29 U. Pirr. L. REv. 65, 85 (1967).
13 Id. at 86.
" 388 U.S. at 223-27.
,1 Crume v. Beto, 383 F.2d 36 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 964 (1970);
Morris v. State, 184 So. 2d 199 (Fla. App. 1966); Boyers v. State, 198 Ga. 838, 33
S.E.2d 251 (1945); People v. Owens, 126 Ill. App. 2d 379, 261 N.E.2d 785 (1970);
People v. Wicks, 115 Ill. App. 2d 19, 252 N.E.2d 698 (1969); People v. Crenshaw,
15 Ill. 2d 458, 155 N.E.2d 599 (1959); People v. Pecho, 362 Ill. 568, 200 N.E. 860
(1936); Presley v. State, 224 Md. 550, 168 A.2d 510 (1961); Richardson v. State, 168
Miss. 788, 151 So. 910 (1934); State v. Dean, 400 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. 1966); State v.
Ramirez, 76 N.M. 72, 412 P.2d 246 (1966); State v. Bazemore, 193 N.C. 336, 137
S.E. 172 (1927); Barrett v. State, 190 Tenn. 366, 229 S.W.2d 516 (1950).
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show the general treatment they receive from the courts. In a
Maryland case the defendant was the only one required to wear a
red cap described by the witness as being worn by her attacker."0
In another case the lineup was composed of the suspect and police
officers who were wearing parts of their regular uniforms, thus
singling out the suspect." In both cases the respective courts held
that the lineups were not unreasonably suggestive. In a Canadian
case the defendant had been picked out of a lineup of six men of
which he was the only Oriental. There are cases in which a black-
haired suspect was placed among a group of light-haired persons,
a tall suspect was forced to participate with short non-suspects,
and a suspect approximately age twenty stood with five other per-
sons all of whom were over forty.7" To correct such injustices, police
should require at least six persons in addition to the accused to
participate in the lineup. These six subjects should be of approxi-
mately the same height, weight, coloration of skin, coloration of
hair, and bodily build. They should also be similarly dressed so no
one person stands out from the rest.
Another safeguard which should be built into the procedure is
that the witness should not know any of the persons he is called
upon to view, and no one in the lineup should know the suspect.
Unintentional glances by non-suspects are suggestive to a percep-
tive viewing witness.8
Fourth, voice identification should be permitted, but only to
the extent of allowing repetition of innocuous phrases. Voice iden-
tification is a useful method of identifying a suspect whose voice
was distinctive during the commission of the crime, especially in
cases where the victim or witness did not get a complete or long
view of the culprit. Repetition of the exact words used during the
commission of the crime might be too suggestive, however, espe-
cially in the mind of a victim causing the possibility of misidentifi-
cation and raising the question of reliability.8' In a South Carolina
" Presley v. State, 224 Md. 550, 168 A.2d 510 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
957 (1962).
7 United States v. Richards, 442 F.2d 922 (4th Cir. 1971).
76 WALL, EYEWITNESs IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CAsES 53 (1965). In each of
these cases, the lineup procedure was held not to be unnecessarily suggestive.
11 Comment, 29 U. PITT. L. REv. 65, 81 (1967).
" 20 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS Eyewitness Identification § 10 (1968).
R, State v. Taylor, 213 S.C. 330, 49 S.E.2d 289 (1948). Some courts have held
that requiring a defendant to repeat words allegedly spoken at the time of the
criminal act is not unfairly suggestive as long as all participants in the identifica-
[Vol. 78
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case the court held that forcing the accused to repeat the alleged
words used by a rapist was inadmissible and highly prejudicial . 2
Where the witness bases his identification on voice alone, the
weight of prior suggestions is especially heavy in the victim's
mind."3 If it is necessary to use voice identification, each individual
in the lineup should be asked to repeat the same words the same
number of times." Possibly two lineups should be conducted, the
first in the dark where voice is the only characteristic presented,
and the second with the lights on so that the witness must make
an identification combining the voice with the physical appear-
ance . 5 This two-step process would insure the accused that it was
not coincidental that the victim or witness recognized his voice.
Fifth, each witness should make his identification separately.
In a California case, a lineup was conducted in an auditorium on
a stage behind bright lights. The audience consisted of over one
hundred witnesses to several alleged state and federal robberies
each charged to the suspect, and the identification by each witness
was made in the presence of the other witnesses." On appeal to the
United States Supreme Court, the conviction was reversed and the
lineup procedure declared illegal. In the language of the Court,
"[iln the absence of legislative regulations adequate to avoid the
hazards to a fair trial which inhere in lineups as presently con-
ducted, the desirability of deterring the constitutionally objection-
able practice must prevail over the undesirability of excluding
relevant evidence."87 This decision suggests that the courts are
willing to go further in protecting the post-indictment rights of the
accused than they were prior to the Wade decision, especially
where the identification procedure is clearly out of line. The courts
are now allowing counsel to appear at the lineup to protect his
client's due process rights, with the penalty for noncompliance
being the exclusion of any evidence there obtained.
Sixth, police should be enjoined by statute from suggesting to
the witness which person is the suspect. The overreaching inherent
tion procedure are required to repeat the same phrases. United States ex rel. Ben-
nett v. Myers, 381 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 973 (1968).
82 State v. Taylor, 213 S.C. 330, 49 S.E.2d 289 (1948).
Palmer v. Peyton, 359 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1966).
u Comment, 29 U. Prrr. L. REv. 65, 86 (1967).
'Id.
88 Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
Id. at 273; cf. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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when the police suggest to the witness which person is the suspect
is illustrated by cases in which the police have informed a witness
in advance of the viewing that one of the persons exhibited was
thought to have committed the crime,88 or where the police ac-
tually tell the witness which person they suspect. 9 Knowing that
the man suspected by the police is present, the witness is likely to
trust the police not to have brought in the wrong man. On this
assumption the witness may make every effort to strain his recol-
lection in an attempt to corroborate the suspicion of the police in
order to bring a suspected criminal to justice." If counsel is present
at the time of the lineup, he may ask that the police do not suggest
that the suspect is in fact present or that one particular participant
is the suspect. If the police disregard his request, he can note the
illegality and move to have the evidence suppressed so that it does
not reach the jury. 1
VII. CONCLUSION
Regardless of how the initial misidentification comes about, it
is clear that the witness is apt to remember the image of the person
he identified, and the reliability of any subsequent identification
in the courtroom is greatly reduced. At present most courts are
unwilling to exclude evidence obtained in violation of these guide-
lines unless the conduct of the lineup, showup, or identification
parade was clearly abusive. The requirement that counsel be pres-
ent during pretrial confrontations to oversee the process is a step
forward in assuring the accused a fair trial; however, until statutes
are adopted outlining permissible and impermissible lineup proce-
dures, the fate of the accused may be within the hands of those
conducting the lineup, and the "t6tality of the circumstances" test
will continue to allow the prosecution to engage in subtle, and
often not so subtle, forms of suggestion in the conduct of such
identifications.
Diana L. Fuller
People v. Williams, 117 Ill. App. 2d 34, 254 N.E.2d 81 (1969); Common-
wealth v. Lee, 215 Pa. Super. 240, 257 A.2d 326 (1969).
"Redmon v. Commonwealth, 321 S.W.2d 397 (Ky. Ct. App. 1959).
9o Williams and Hammelmann, Identification Parades, (pt. 1) 1963 Crm. L.
REV. (Eng.) 479.
" See note 41 supra.
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